How Is the Global Order Being Undermined?
By Abdul Naser Noorzad, security and geopolitics researcher, especially for Sangar
We often speak about a transitional era and the formation of a post-polar world order. It is precisely within this theoretical paradigm that the current war in the Middle East can be analyzed and assessed. In fact, the region has not yet reached the stage of consolidating a post-polar order and remains in the midst of a deep and tense transitional period. This situation is the result of a systemic erosion of the structure of the international order—an erosion that has brought the world to a state of anxiety, fear, and chronic deadlock. Such a condition has emerged against a backdrop of economic, security, and geopolitical interdependence and casts its shadow over global relations.
At first glance, the United States, Israel, and Iran appear to be the direct participants in this war. In reality, however, Russia, China, the Arab states, Turkey, and the Europeans are also involved in this crisis in various ways, and none of them can easily escape its consequences. This reflects a comprehensive and largely unpredictable crisis for both allies and rivals on all fronts. The contemporary war in the Middle East is taking the form of a new asymmetric conflict between a regional power—Iran—and a global hegemon—the United States; a conflict unfolding within a complex and multilayered geopolitical environment. At the same time, Eastern powers, each with its own agendas and capabilities, are attempting to shift the balance of power in this great global game in their favor.
With its considerable missile capabilities, Iran has managed to create a kind of strategic stalemate on the battlefield. China and Russia are, to some extent, satisfied with the current situation, yet it should not be forgotten that each of them pursues its own objectives and strategic agendas. China, taking advantage of the current circumstances, seeks to weaken the remaining pillars of American hegemony in the region and expand its economic and strategic influence. Russia, for its part, is interested in the crisis continuing at a controlled level, as such a situation could strengthen its position in global energy markets and preserve its role in geopolitical equations.
The United States, by contrast, seeks through fundamental changes in the region’s security architecture—particularly in a scenario involving the disappearance of the Islamic Republic regime in Iran—to maintain control over vital energy arteries and raw material resources. From a strategic perspective, such a goal could limit energy-hungry China’s access to resources and prevent it from becoming a global economic hegemon. Israel is also attempting to take advantage of this opportunity in order, relying on American military and technological power, to eliminate the Iranian threat once and for all and subsequently, by containing other regional powers—including the Arab states, Turkey, and even Pakistan—to transform itself into the region’s unquestioned power.
Meanwhile, Turkey, Egypt, and other military powers in the region are concerned about the possible collapse of the Middle Eastern security system and the consequences that may follow. They fear that if the current structure of power in Iran were to collapse, the region could enter a phase of widespread instability and intense competition over the division of spheres of influence. At the same time, it is noteworthy that at both regional and international levels, there is virtually no actor that desires a complete victory for Iran in this war of attrition. Even Russia, China, the Arab states, and Turkey are less interested in the victory of one side than in using the existing circumstances to improve their own strategic positions and avoid the potential costs of the crisis.
On the other hand, many expected that the shift of power from West to East would occur only in the form of a world war. What is happening today is, to some extent, a modern reflection of that scenario. However, due to nuclear deterrence and the military capabilities of the great powers, such a confrontation no longer manifests itself in the form of a classical world war. Instead, competition continues in the form of regional wars, proxy conflicts, economic warfare, and geopolitical pressure. From this perspective, the transition of power in the international system is neither a simple and rapid process nor an unexpected one; rather, it is gradual, complex, and deeply exhausting.
What is taking place in the Middle East today cannot be interpreted merely as a military or political defeat of one side. Above all, it represents an exhausting defeat at the systemic level—a defeat occurring within the framework of the inefficiency of the existing structure of the world order. In other words, systemic weakness in managing global competition and excessive dependence on fragile alliances have created the conditions for such crises. Under the circumstances of asymmetric games, miscalculations, and poor timing, this security crisis has acquired global dimensions.
An important question is why the current stalemate in the confrontation between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran—with the implicit support of Russia and China—on the other is not perceived as an obvious military or strategic defeat. The answer lies in the fact that the technological capabilities and military readiness of the great powers are not the primary cause of the crisis. Its roots lie in a miscalculation at the level of a major global paradigm—a paradigm that no longer corresponds to the realities of today’s world.
The liberal order after the Second World War, the “American peace” after the Cold War, and the democratic peace theory were all based on a kind of unequal partnership between the United States and Europe. Today, however, this framework is facing a structural deadlock. The modern world no longer requires the old order, and its propositions are incapable of resolving the complex crises of our time. Opportunities and challenges that should have been managed within systemic capabilities now appear as serious threats due to the inability of the existing system to respond effectively. The emergence of new actors, the development of military and economic technologies, and changing patterns of global competition all demonstrate that the realities of today’s world differ profoundly from the intellectual frameworks of the past.
Under such conditions, attempts by the United States to restore the balance of power using the capabilities of the existing system appear far from realistic. The mismatch between strategic objectives and systemic capacities itself becomes a factor intensifying the crisis. The United States is attempting to overcome this crisis without acknowledging the existing stalemate, relying on pressure, unilateral actions, and the use of hard power. However, the expansion of the geography of its security commitments, deep internal divisions within American society, and the decline of global trust in the intentions and credibility of the United States have effectively weakened many of its traditional instruments of power.
As a result, the network of alliances created after the Second World War and during the Cold War to contain the Soviet Union is now experiencing serious erosion. Pressure on NATO members, disagreements with Europe, tensions with close neighbors such as Canada and Mexico, and growing distrust among Middle Eastern countries are all signs of the gradual crumbling of the protective walls of American hegemony. Even if the United States wishes to do so, restoring the level of international trust that emerged under the unique historical circumstances following the Second World War will be extremely difficult.
In this complex process, the main factor behind the weakening of American hegemony has been systemic weakness in managing the global order. At the same time, U.S. rivals have been able to take advantage of this situation. Over the past two decades, China has steadily strengthened its position in the global economy by focusing on the development of global supply chains and expanding its economic influence in Latin America, Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East. Russia, likewise, has used the failures of U.S. military interventions in various regions of the world to establish new strategic relationships in Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and South America.
One clear example of this trend is the deepening of energy relations between Russia and India. While India seeks to maintain relations with the United States in order to benefit from Washington’s support in its competition with China, it has simultaneously developed close ties with Russia within the framework of BRICS and has become one of its important partners in the energy market. Such a multi-vector approach reflects the growing complexity of international politics during the current transitional period.
In East Asia, countries such as South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, despite concerns about the growing power of China, Russia, and North Korea, continue to rely on security alliances with the United States with a certain degree of doubt and disappointment. Agreements such as AUKUS and QUAD reflect less a complete confidence in the United States than an attempt by these states to manage regional threats under conditions of strategic uncertainty.
However, recent developments indicate that the United States is often unable to provide convincing responses to the security concerns of its partners. For instance, the transfer of the THAAD missile defense system from South Korea to the Middle East— a system whose deployment in Korea about nine years ago came at the cost of deteriorating the country’s economic relations with China—demonstrates how rapidly Washington’s strategic priorities are changing. Such moves signal that some regions no longer occupy their previous place in the broader strategy of the United States.
Ultimately, the combination of these developments shows that the world is currently in a phase of historical transition—a stage in which the old order has not yet collapsed, while the new one has not yet fully taken shape. The Middle East lies at the very center of this transition and has become one of the most important arenas of geopolitical competition among the great powers. Under such circumstances, regional crises are no longer merely local problems; rather, they reflect broader dynamics within the international system.
Overall, the current crisis in the Middle East should be viewed as part of a profound transformation in the structure of the world order—a transformation in which the international system is moving from unipolar hegemony toward a more complex post-polar configuration. The wars and tensions in the region are not merely the result of local rivalries but also a reflection of the structural erosion of the liberal order established after the Second World War and the growing competition among great powers to redefine the global balance of power. In such an environment, regional and extra-regional actors are less concerned with achieving decisive victory than with preserving or strengthening their strategic positions amid structural instability. Therefore, what is unfolding in the Middle East today is not simply a military confrontation, but a symbol of a deep crisis in the international system and an indication of the gradual emergence of a new global order.
