Pakistan, combining war and diplomacy, does not seek the destruction of the Taliban.
By Abdul Naser Noorzad, researcher in politics and geopolitics, especially for “Sangar”
Pakistan’s interesting game, in coordination with major U.S. strategies in the region that are in confrontation with regional powers, is entering a sensitive phase. In this analytical context, the connection between ongoing developments and the crisis in the Middle East has been evident from the very beginning.
However, against this backdrop, changes have occurred in the system of regional security perceptions, to which Pakistan is also adapting to new conditions. This synchronicity and adaptation coincide with profound transformations in the region’s security sphere, in whose shadow Pakistan seeks to advance its interests.
It should be emphasized that for Pakistan, the absolute priority is the neutralization of serious threats. Control over groups, organizations, and individuals, as well as preventing the Taliban from becoming an independent, arbitrary, and uncontrollable force, constitutes a “red line” for Islamabad and its security structures.
In this context, it also remains important that the Taliban should not proceed with agreements and engagement with other actors without taking Pakistan’s position into account. At the same time, India, within the framework of Islamabad’s preventive doctrine and that of Asian powers, finds itself aligned with them in one direction under conditions of a Western strategy of destabilization.
At the same time, Islamabad’s doctrine of preventive defense, based on the concept of strategic depth, is transforming both its content and methods of implementation. As a result, Pakistan is effectively changing its doctrine in the Afghan direction: it is no longer about reacting to an attack, but about shifting to preemptive strikes in accordance with contemporary demands and priorities.
Within this doctrine, Afghanistan, in Pakistan’s broader vision, should become a source of control over managed threats vis-à-vis India, Iran, Russia, and China. Moreover, in a wider context—amid Islamabad’s rivalry with Turkey and Arab countries—this potential is also expected to be utilized.
In this complex situation, the Taliban at times finds itself in a closed circle of pressure and isolation. In a broader analysis, the group is compelled to comply with Pakistan and the West; however, internal factors, fear of instability, and the need to seek alternative paths out of one-sided dependence on the West and Pakistan push it toward deviating from the commitments of the Doha Agreement. This deviation follows a path that leads toward Beijing, Delhi, Moscow, and Tehran.
It is precisely this complexity of the situation that sometimes leads to military confrontation and mutual military actions between the Taliban and Pakistan, and at other times gives way to diplomacy.
For this reason, at times, military and operational pressure on the group, justified by limited strikes, sustains tension. From Islamabad’s perspective, the Taliban must not collapse or be replaced by another force; it must remain dependent, predictable, and mindful of Pakistan’s vital security interests.
Even the conduct of operations in the eastern regions of Afghanistan, in Pakistan’s strategic vision, is an attempt to consolidate reality as irreversible. In this process, diplomacy is sometimes effective, while at other times, instruments of pressure play the key role. To this end, a coordinated package of pressure measures is activated simultaneously against the Taliban to keep it outside the sphere of influence of Islamabad’s competitors.
At the same time, the level of tension is deliberately maintained at a controlled and measurable level, so that it is neither ineffective nor excessively high and costly for Pakistan. Ultimately, the main objective of this, at times risky, game by Pakistan in the security sphere is to send an indirect signal to other groups: if they act contrary to Islamabad’s interests, Afghanistan will no longer be a safe place for them.
In this game, one of the key features that provides Islamabad with a reliable advantage is the structural weakness of the Taliban. This group, despite its dependence, lack of legitimacy, dark terrorist past, and documented organized crimes against humanity, also suffers from limited resources. Therefore, Pakistan, relying on its informational superiority, directs pressure precisely at these vulnerable points in order to achieve the best possible outcome.
It is evident that Pakistan’s efforts to construct such large-scale scenarios and increase expenditures in the security sphere are driven by concerns over the emergence of unpredictable and sudden developments. Since the global attitude toward the Taliban is tactical, temporary, and situational, it may change at any moment. In such a case, Islamabad’s strategic asset—the Taliban—could disappear in an instant, and all incurred costs would prove futile.
In essence, Pakistan’s main concern is related to the possible dramatic development of events in Afghanistan that would occur without taking its position into account. Therefore, despite all its support for the Taliban, Islamabad does not fully trust it, although it has not abandoned it altogether.
This means that if the global approach to the Taliban changes, the group may be used as a bargaining instrument and a kind of “trump card” for Islamabad. Consequently, maintaining a limited and controlled level of tension around the Taliban remains an important element of Pakistan’s strategy.
Ultimately, Pakistan, combining war and diplomacy, does not seek to destroy the Taliban, but rather to keep it in a kind of “geopolitical cage”—a space with limited freedom of action, yet without excessive maintenance costs. This complex game, under conditions where nothing is fully reliable, is viewed by Islamabad as a strategic opportunity and will continue in a “cat-and-mouse” format until the situation is finally clarified.
