How can the security order in the Middle East be redefined?
By Abdul Naser Noorzad, researcher in politics and geopolitics, especially for “Sangar”
Providing a precise answer to the question of whether a war between Iran and the United States marks the beginning of a new regional order is inherently complex and multilayered. This complexity stems from the fact that the previous security order in the Middle East was itself the result of a long historical process and was shaped by multiple factors: the strategic geography of the region, the presence of diverse state and non-state actors, the role of vested economic organizations, the unilateral interests of the United States, the intensification of sectarian tensions, and the persistence of secular authoritarian regimes. Together, these factors formed a complex balance-of-power structure long before any recent developments—one that could not be easily dismantled or replaced.
Nevertheless, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S.-led “Greater Middle East” initiative, the events known as the Arab Spring, the fall of certain regimes opposed to Washington, as well as the rise and expansion of non-state actors such as Shiite groups, ISIS, and al-Qaeda, have gradually eroded this order.
In this context, the Islamic Republic of Iran, following a strategy of “strategic depth,” sought to expand its influence in the region. In addition, the emergence of the “Abraham Accords” and recent military developments, including limited but impactful conflicts, effectively disrupted previous equations and created the conditions for the region’s transition into a new phase of security and interaction.
One of the most defining features of the new situation is the relative decline of U.S. hegemony. This decline does not signify the complete disappearance of America’s role but rather reflects a limitation in its ability to impose unilateral will. The hegemony that took shape within the framework of the so-called “Pax Americana” after World War II was based on the creation of states aligned with Washington and the provision of their security. During the Cold War and even afterward, this order largely enabled the United States to maintain a favorable balance. However, recent developments have shown that this model is no longer as effective as it once was.
Under the new conditions, the perspectives of regional states have also evolved. Absolute reliance on the U.S. “security umbrella,” especially at a time when Washington itself is engaged in global competition with powers such as China, is no longer perceived as a sustainable strategy.
As a result, countries in the region are seeking to diversify their external relations and establish a balance among major powers. This shift in approach is one of the key indicators of the transition toward a multipolar order.
In this context, several possible scenarios for the formation of a new order can be envisioned.
The first is an attempt to create a form of collective security system among Arab countries that could act as a counterweight to other actors.
The second scenario involves moving toward flexible security arrangements with Eastern powers, particularly China, in which Iran’s interests would also be taken into account to some extent.
The third is the formation of security buffer zones that could prevent the escalation of tensions and create a kind of fragile but manageable equilibrium.
These scenarios are not necessarily mutually exclusive and may instead materialize in a combined form in the future of the region.
In this context, the role of regional powers has also increased significantly. Countries possessing economic, military, and demographic capacities are now, more than ever, striving to play an active role in redefining the security order.
The accumulation of arms, increases in defense budgets, and the development of deterrence capabilities all indicate a movement toward a certain form of security self-reliance. However, this process will not be sustainable without taking into account the interests of major powers, especially in the energy sector.
The gradual multipolarization of the region means that no single power is any longer capable of unilaterally determining the rules of the game. Instead, a complex and multilayered system is emerging, in which various actors operate with sometimes conflicting and sometimes overlapping interests.
Under these conditions, countries that are able to navigate current crises with minimal damage will have a greater chance of becoming future centers of power. Turkey, for example, if it adopts an appropriate strategic posture, could become one of these centers, although this will largely depend on how it interacts with other actors, including Israel and Iran.
Despite all these changes, the United States will continue to remain a key player. Its military presence, intelligence networks, and economic influence remain important tools in shaping regional dynamics. Even if the number of U.S. military bases decreases, their function as instruments of pressure and oversight will remain intact. Therefore, talk of the complete disappearance of the U.S. role is more an exaggeration than a realistic analysis.
Alongside the United States, China’s role as an economic—and gradually also a security—actor is steadily increasing. By focusing on energy security and the expansion of economic ties, Beijing is pursuing a low-cost, low-tension approach. This strategy allows China to expand its influence in the region without direct involvement in conflicts. Bilateral agreements with Arab countries and Iran are part of this strategy, which in the long term may solidify China’s position as one of the key powers.
In turn, Russia views the region primarily through the lens of security and geopolitics. Moscow’s objective is not only to limit U.S. influence but also to build new alliances and strengthen its position in the global system. Despite competition in the energy market between Russia and Middle Eastern countries, from a security perspective, the region holds particular importance for the Kremlin. The experience of the Cold War has also demonstrated that Russia is capable of playing an active role in developments in the Middle East.
Nevertheless, the main challenge in the formation of a new order lies in its transitional and unstable nature. The region is undergoing a period of transition marked by uncertainty, instability, and the absence of a unified and coherent security doctrine. This situation increases the likelihood of new crises, but at the same time creates opportunities for redefining relationships and building new structures.
Ultimately, it can be said that what is happening in the Strait of Hormuz and in the Middle East as a whole is not the beginning of a completely new order, but rather the beginning of the process of its formation—an order that has not yet been consolidated, but whose signs are already clearly visible.
The future of this order depends on many factors, including the direction of Iran’s policies, the positioning of Arab states, the role of major powers, as well as Israel’s place within this system. One thing is clear: the region will no longer be easily dominated by a single power, and its trajectory is moving toward gradual multipolarity—albeit one accompanied by significant costs and challenges.
