Even the Pashtunwali will not save the Taliban.
Author: Abdulnaser Nurzad, analyst
The Haqqani network, Mullah Yaqub's group and the Qatar office, and the group led by Mullah Haibatullah are the three main sides in the battle for power and wealth within the Taliban regime.
In addition, discrimination against Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, who are part of the Taliban, is becoming more and more noticeable every day. So far, what has been heard has been at the level of rumors and speculation, but now, with the public statements of the Taliban leaders, divisions and confrontations between the Taliban are an indisputable fact.
The level of these differences is very high, and the level of confrontation between the Taliban is not limited to the issue of power and wealth. Of course, the internal divisions of the Taliban are not limited to ideological differences and are also linked to racial and ethnic differences. There are many analyzes that show that the Taliban are ideologically divided, and this issue of disagreement and confrontation between them actually shows a misunderstanding of the ideological nature of this group. The border between the Pashtuns and their various tribes, the Tajiks and Uzbeks, and even the Hazaras who were part of the Taliban, raised the level of this confrontation and conflict between the Taliban to an astonishingly high level. In many cases, the possibility of internal conflict between the Taliban is even felt. These conflicts should be taken seriously. Because they have developed to the point where some see them as an opportunity for ISIS to recruit troops from the Taliban. But other reports show that it is not only high-ranking officials and Taliban sub-groups that are experiencing problems in the process of running the country. External forces are also involved in the aggravation of these conflicts.
I'm going to highlight some of the assumptions in case these confrontations continue and briefly describe the picture that emerges as a result of their occurrence.
FIRST, the three main powers within the Taliban, namely the Haqqani network, Qatar-Yaqub's group, and Taliban leader Mullah Haibatullah's group are in constant conflict. All three groups have strong pretensions about the division of power, wealth, and interaction with the world. Although the Taliban are concerned about the emergence of these divisions, these divisions have now become commonplace and have spread to the upper echelons and ranks of the Taliban. Meanwhile, the group of Mullah Haibatullah, the leader of the Taliban, is stronger and in control of power. Two other groups, such as the Haqqani group and the Qatar-Yaqub group, are in second and third place. The Haqqanis have more fighters and the Qatari faction is more political;
SECONDLY, the desire of each group to interact with the outside world is different. The older generation of the Taliban operates in the old way and has a more ideological approach. But the younger generation, which includes Haqqani and the Qatar-Yaqub group, wants to soften up and interact with the outside world and act more gently. This generation of Taliban, while maintaining their power and mono-ethnic structure, wants the survival of the regime and abandoned the ideology. This group sees engagement with the US and its allies as essential to the survival of the Taliban in power and seeks to engage with the US and its allies;
THIRDLY, at the same time, the Haqqani group, which wants to interact with the US and its allies, is associated with Al-Qaeda and terrorist groups such as the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, Ansarullah of Tajikistan and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and uses their strength in the struggle and confrontation other Taliban factions. But the Qatar-Yaqub group realized that it had to engage with the US. If she does not interact with the US, sooner or later the Haqqani or the Kandahar faction will remove her from the political scene. ISIS has also emerged from the Haqqani network and is becoming a force. This issue puts the Qatar-Yaqub and Kandahar groups on a third front, which is extremely troubling. The group in Kandahar, led by Haibatullah, the leader of the Taliban, operates with even greater brutality and intensity and crushes any opposition among the Taliban. For this reason, most of the power is in its hands. The Taliban Defense Minister Mullah Yaqub's group and the Qatari group led by Mullah Baradar demand constructive engagement with the world so that both the Taliban regime survives and continues and avoids the danger of political collapse. In the future, these differences may cause internal turmoil among the Taliban, or the Qatari faction and Mullah Yaqub may come to an understanding with the anti-Taliban movements and form a joint government.
FOURTHLY, the harsh and brutal actions of the Kandahar group led by Mulla Haybatullah prompted the Qatari group and Mullah Yaqub to criticize the way power and wealth were distributed, military installations and equipment left over from the previous regime, drug trafficking, and the radical policies of Mulla Haibatullah and isolate themselves. This discontent has intensified in our day and has changed the ranks of the Taliban. Additional efforts were made to oust the Qatar-Yakub group from the security forces and the Taliban regime, as well as to attract trusted commanders loyal to the invisible leader of the Taliban;
FIFTH, the Taliban are gradually emerging from a strong ideological organization and structure and turning into a polarized and fragmented group. Structures in which one spectrum is formed by pragmatists and the other by principled ideologists. This way of running the Taliban led to increased divisions between the groups and the disappearance of their intellectual and ideological unity. It is currently widely believed that this group is operating as a united front, while deep divisions have been created within this group, which may cause its disintegration in the future. In this case, even the extremely ethnic and limited structure of the Pashtunwali will not prevent the collapse of the Taliban group.
SIXTH, disagreements among the Taliban will lead to four outcomes:
The first is an internal coup by the Taliban side, such as the Qatari faction and Mullah Yaqub, the Haqqani network, and the Kandahar faction led by Haibatullah. It turns out that this assumption is gradually realized and the possibility of its implementation increases. The danger of conflict is felt every minute, and the political power of the Taliban is still subject to collapse.
The second is that as a result of growing dissension among the Taliban, ISIS will emerge from it and become a new pole of power in northern Afghanistan. In this case, it will be difficult for the Taliban. The war will become more intense and the problems of Taliban rule will become more serious. The security will be completely broken, and outside interference will intensify. This will make the field of Afghanistan more divided in terms of play and action. The state of the game will become more complex and turn into a multifactorial problem;
Third, the division of territory among the Taliban and the formation of separate centers of power among this group is a definite and indisputable matter. So ISIS will be the third party and the anti-Taliban resistance groups will be the fourth. The geography of Afghanistan will be divided into several groups;
Fourth, as the competition among the Taliban grows, each branch of the group will work harder to acquire more sources of power and wealth. This conflict violates the security of the entire region, and other terrorist groups take advantage of this situation and decide on terrorist operations outside of Afghanistan.
