Why is no front against the Taliban emerging among the Pashtuns?
Author: Mohammad Arif Rahmani, former member of the Afghan Parliament
The main question is not whether there are opponents of the Taliban among the Pashtuns. Clearly, there are — ranging from intellectuals and technocrats to parts of the political elite, civil activists, and even some traditional figures. The real question is why this opposition, despite its relative breadth and depth, has still not transformed into a unified political-military front against the Taliban.
The answer should not be sought solely in fear, repression, or “ethnic loyalty.” All of these are part of the reality, but the issue is much deeper. In politics, rebellion is прежде всего a calculation of power and only afterward a moral reaction. Societies mobilize against a political order when that order threatens their historical position, collective security, or share of power. Authoritarianism alone is not enough to generate resistance. Many authoritarian regimes have endured precisely because, for part of society, they still remained functional or at least tolerable.
The Taliban should also be understood from this perspective. They are not merely a radical religious movement, but the most radical form of restoring the concentration of power around the Pashtun ethnic core in modern Afghanistan — a model that existed during different periods of Afghan political history, but which the Taliban have reproduced in its most open and organized form. The difference is that this time the concentration of power has been legitimized not through the language of national state-building, but through the language of Sharia, jihad, and the Islamic Emirate. The outcome is obvious: almost all key levers of political, security, and administrative power have been concentrated within a structure that is, to a large extent, ethnically homogeneous.
It is precisely this point that serves as the key to understanding the behavior of a significant part of Pashtun political society. For many other peoples of Afghanistan, the Taliban represents political exclusion, structural marginalization, and a threat to identity; however, for a significant part of Pashtun society, the Taliban is still not regarded as an “existential threat.” On the contrary, despite violence, monopoly, and backwardness, for many they remain the last and purest form of preserving the historical centrality of power.
This is where the distinction between “dissatisfaction” and the “necessity of rebellion” becomes evident. A significant part of the Pashtun elite and intellectuals may have serious disagreements with the Taliban regarding governance, relations with the world, the status of women, education, the economy, or methods of violence. However, these disagreements generally do not extend to rejecting the very foundation of Taliban power. In many cases, the main issue is not “the principle of concentration of power” itself, but rather “the way it is managed.” Put more directly, the principal contradiction between the Taliban and a large segment of its Pashtun opponents concerns the quality of exercising power rather than the fact of possessing it.
As long as disagreements remain at this level, opposition can hardly transform into organized resistance. Rebellion emerges when a group feels that the continuation of the existing order threatens its collective future. Yet so far, the Taliban has not created such a situation for a large part of Pashtun society. Even genuine grievances have not yet reached the level of a “necessity for overthrow.”
Another important factor is the absence of a credible alternative. No Pashtun political movement has yet to present a model that would simultaneously command legitimacy in the eyes of traditional and religious society while also providing confidence that the fall of the Taliban would not lead to the complete collapse of Pashtuns' historical centrality within the power structure.
As a result, many opponents of the Taliban have found themselves trapped between two options: the existing harsh and closed order, or an uncertain and unpredictable future. In such circumstances, even serious opposition most often remains at the level of criticism rather than transforming into organized confrontation.
The Taliban do not rely on force alone; they have linked their monopoly on power with religious legitimacy. In many traditional regions, opposition to the Taliban is not perceived merely as disagreement with a political group, but can easily be portrayed as opposition to an “Islamic government.” This significantly raises the social and moral cost of resistance and limits the possibility of broad mobilization.
Of course, this analysis does not mean that the Taliban represent all Pashtuns or that Pashtun society is unified and of one mind. Pashtun society, like any other, is full of political, generational, class, and tribal divisions. However, despite these fractures, the Taliban have still not become an existential threat for a significant part of this society; and this is precisely the main reason why a broad Pashtun front against them has not emerged.
As long as this equation does not change — that is, as long as the cost of continuing Taliban rule for a significant part of Pashtun society does not become greater than the cost of its collapse — expecting the formation of a serious Pashtun front against the Taliban does not correspond to the current reality of power in Afghanistan.
