Special attention in the secret document of the “fierce mullahs” is given to representatives from Chechnya.
By Andrey Serenko, special correspondent for NG
The Taliban’s counterintelligence is increasing its control over the activities of Russian and Belarusian intelligence agents in Afghanistan. Exposing the operations of spies from Moscow and Minsk has become one of the priorities of the Taliban’s Main Intelligence Directorate (MID). Agents from the Union State are suspected of attempting to use Afghanistan to create tension “between East and West.”
The head of Directorate 376 (counterintelligence) of the Taliban’s MID, Mawlawi Asadullah Baryalay, sent a secret document to Directorate 061 (analytical service) on September 21 (a copy is available to NG), specifying the priorities of the Taliban security service in combating foreign espionage. The document contains several interesting and unexpected details.
First, the Taliban’s counterintelligence has recorded signs of the creation of a spy network in Afghanistan composed of agents from the intelligence services of Russia, Belarus, and Chechnya. Interestingly, the Taliban consider the Chechen Republic separately from Russia, although they link agents from Grozny, like those from Minsk, to Moscow’s overall spy network.
“Intelligence personnel from Belarus, Russia, and Chechnya, all of whom are connected to the Russian KGB (as stated in the text – NG), plan to enter the country under the guise of tourists and contractual companies, and some of them have already arrived,” reads the information bulletin from the head of Taliban counterintelligence.
Second, the Taliban intelligence service has no doubt that members of the Union State’s espionage network in Afghanistan are not only conducting spy operations but also working to create conflicts of interest among different countries. The MID considers this latter objective to be the primary goal.
According to Mawlawi Asadullah Baryalay, the mission of the Moscow and Minsk agents “consists solely in achieving intelligence objectives, primarily in creating tension between East and West.”
Third, due to the increased activity of the Union State’s intelligence in Afghanistan, the Taliban counterintelligence insists on organizing “careful monitoring and investigation” of agents from Moscow, Grozny, and Minsk, emphasizing that this work “is the responsibility of the intelligence and investigative bodies” of the Taliban regime. The head of counterintelligence of the “Islamic Emirate” insists that the analytical division of the Taliban MID communicate the content of his message “to other security and intelligence bodies” within the Taliban.
The Taliban counterintelligence document from September 21 is a logical continuation of its previous report from July 7 of this year, which NG reported on (see issue of 10.07.25). In the July document, Asadullah Baryalay noted the increased presence of Russian tourists, journalists, and other travelers in Afghanistan, suggesting that they were likely intelligence agents. At that time, the head of Taliban counterintelligence predicted a probable increase in Russian intelligence activity in the Taliban emirate.
Two and a half months later, Baryalay explicitly states the emergence of a Moscow-Minsk spy network in Afghanistan. According to the text of the September message, the head of Taliban counterintelligence directs the security and intelligence service of the “Islamic Emirate” not only to carefully monitor the activities of suspected Russian and Belarusian agents but also to disrupt their operations aimed against Western interests in the region.
It is also clear that Taliban counterintelligence will do its utmost to block the Union State intelligence services from obtaining secret or sensitive information relevant to the regime of the “fierce mullahs” in Afghanistan. The seriousness of the Taliban MID’s intentions is illustrated by the recent case of the arrest of the well-known Russian ethnographer Svyatoslav Kaverin in Kunduz. He spent more than 50 days in various prisons of the Taliban intelligence services; the Taliban suspected Kaverin of working for Russian intelligence and attempted to prove this by detaining the scholar.
Afghan experts interpreted Kaverin’s arrest as a clear signal from the Taliban to Moscow about the need to halt active espionage activities in Afghanistan. “If the Russian side does not heed this warning, the Taliban may carry out an even harsher preventive operation, with outcomes far less favorable than in Kaverin’s case,” commented a former employee of Afghan intelligence services.
According to the expert, “Since Taliban counterintelligence has recorded an increase in Belarusian intelligence activity, active measures against Belarusian citizens in Afghanistan may follow. One should be prepared for the possibility that a Belarusian tourist could find themselves in an unpleasant situation similar to that of Svyatoslav Kaverin.”
Afghan analysts believe that the Taliban MID may also intensify its espionage activities in Russia and Belarus, including by using its agents among Afghan communities and some Central Asian diasporas in the Union State.
