What Is Russia’s Strategy in Afghanistan?
By Abdul Naser Noorzad, security and geopolitics researcher, especially for Sangar
Zamir Kabulov, the Special Representative of the President of Russia, stated that his country will not allow the United States to regain control of the Bagram military base. At the same time, he called on the Taliban and Pakistan to cooperate in combating terrorism. Meanwhile, Kabulov also expressed concern over the presence of terrorist groups in Afghanistan.
These statements indicate Russia’s multilayered and complex game in Afghanistan. At first glance, it may seem that Russia is acting chaotically in the Afghan arena. However, a deeper analysis shows that Moscow’s strategy is neither the result of informational weakness nor confusion; on the contrary, it reflects a deliberate, multi-level, and calculated game at both regional and supra-regional levels.
Moscow is consciously pursuing a path that may appear unclear, contradictory, and even misleading to other actors. Yet this ambiguity is part of its strategic design. Simultaneous engagement with the Taliban and Pakistan in counterterrorism efforts is not merely a simple choice, but rather a tactical bet on unreliable actors to maintain informational control and an effective presence in the Afghan space.
At the core of this approach lies the preservation of Russia’s “strategic backyard” in Central Asia — a region that holds a key place in its Eurasian security doctrine. By emphasizing threats emanating from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, Russia effectively creates grounds for strengthening and justifying its military presence in Central Asia. This exaggeration of the threat is not only a reaction to real risks but also part of an active strategy to consolidate regional influence.
By leveraging the complex relations between the Taliban, Pakistan, and the United States, Russia expands its room for maneuver. Moscow fully understands that distrust, disagreements, and competition have always marked relations among these actors — and it is precisely these weaknesses that it exploits to achieve its operational goals. Unlike during the Cold War, Russia’s modern foreign policy is less ideological and far more pragmatic and flexible: instead of stable alliances, it relies on temporary coalitions and situational interests.
In this context, Moscow simultaneously considers multiple scenarios. If Pakistan were to shift toward other actors, or if the Taliban were to change its behavior under external pressure, Russia must not be caught off guard. Therefore, maintaining relations with the Taliban is for Russia more of an informational and tactical necessity than a long-term strategic choice. The Taliban is not a final partner, but rather one of several temporary instruments in a much more complex game — just as it is for other powers.
Within this strategy, Russia also deliberately uses the issue of the Bagram base. Raising this topic — even without clear signs of real action from the United States — creates a kind of “informational shock” that can provoke reactions from various actors while also forming a protective barrier against potential scenarios. This approach is part of a preventive information game aimed at buying time, increasing regional sensitivity, and avoiding surprises.
In this context, what may at first appear as contradictions in Russia’s policy is in fact a tool for simultaneously managing multiple risks and opportunities. Moscow is not seeking total victory in Afghanistan, nor is it interested in establishing absolute stability in the country; its primary objective is to prevent the emergence of a stable order shaped by rivals such as the United States.
From Russia’s perspective, an unstable but manageable Afghanistan offers several layered advantages: justification for military presence in Central Asia, maintenance of active information channels, shifting the costs of crisis onto others, and preventing rival powers from consolidating their influence.
Ultimately, Russia’s strategy is based on the principle that one cannot remain alone in the Afghan arena. The simultaneous presence of multiple actors — even in a vague and competitive form — is more acceptable and even preferable for Moscow than an empty stage where a single power could dominate unchallenged.
From this point of view, Russia prefers the continuation of a complex, costly, and multilateral game over the establishment of a simple order that would benefit its rivals.
