A war with Iran not only contradicts the U.S. Constitution but also poses a serious threat to global security, the American economy, and the credibility of its democracy.
Author: Mohibullah Noori, former head of the Political Affairs Division of Afghanistan’s National Security Council and a member of the Sangar Advisory Council
Original article: چرا آمریکا وارد جنگ با ایران نخواهد شد؟
Amid rising military tensions between Iran and Israel and the intensification of aggressive rhetoric from President Donald Trump regarding a possible military strike against Iran, a pressing question emerges: Is the United States on the brink of entering another war in the Middle East?
This analysis, based on empirical evidence, legal frameworks, and strategic trends, argues that the likelihood of such a war is extremely low. Despite external pressures, the U.S. is unlikely to engage in a direct military confrontation with Iran.
1 - Painful Past Experiences and the Rise of Anti-War Sentiment in the U.S.
U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), which cost thousands of lives and trillions of dollars, failed to yield significant strategic gains for Washington. These costly failures have fostered deep public skepticism toward future military ventures, particularly in the Middle East.
According to polls by the Pew Research Center and CNN in the first half of 2025, over 60% of Americans oppose initiating a new war in the region. Even among Republicans, who traditionally support a more interventionist foreign policy, the majority are against military conflict. This public sentiment significantly restricts the Trump administration’s military options.
2 - Trump’s Campaign Promises and the Priority of Domestic Economics
Donald Trump, in both his presidential campaigns, repeatedly criticized the “endless wars” and emphasized the need to focus on rebuilding the U.S. economy. Entering a new war—especially with an unpredictable opponent like Iran—not only contradicts his campaign promises but also risks losing support from middle-class and conservative isolationist voters.
Trump’s recent statements in June 2025—such as “nobody knows what I will do” and “next week will be very important”—are more likely part of a deliberate strategy of ambiguity and negotiation pressure, rather than signals of real military readiness. In diplomatic terms, this is known as “coercive diplomacy” (Belfer Center, Harvard).
3 - Legal and Constitutional Constraints
According to Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, only Congress has the authority to declare war formally. As Commander-in-Chief, the president may only initiate military action with official Congressional authorization or under temporarily delegated powers.
Furthermore, under the War Powers Resolution of 1973, the president must notify Congress within 48 hours of launching military operations. If Congress does not grant authorization within 60 days, the forces must be withdrawn.
In addition, U.S. intelligence agencies—including the CIA, DIA, NSA, and ODNI—have stated in official reports that there is no evidence that Iran is actively pursuing nuclear weapons. These assessments are persuasive enough for a bipartisan majority in Congress to reject any military authorization.
4 - Strategic Pivot: From the War on Terror to Geopolitical Rivalry with China
One of the main reasons the U.S. will not go to war with Iran is a fundamental shift in its strategic priorities over the past decade. The Trump administration has redirected U.S. foreign policy focus from traditional counterterrorism in the Middle East toward a global rivalry with China across economic, technological, and military domains.
In the U.S. National Security Strategy, the Indo-Pacific region is now seen as the “central theater of 21st-century strategic competition.” China’s growing influence poses a more pressing threat to U.S. interests than instability in the Middle East.
Examples of this strategic pivot include:
The Doha Agreement with the Taliban (2020): This led to the withdrawal of most U.S. troops from Afghanistan, symbolizing the official end of America’s extensive military presence there.
Drawdown in Syria: A shift from ground operations to indirect containment and tactical engagement with local actors, including direct contact with the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, previously designated a terrorist. This shows a pragmatic approach: managing regional stability through tactical cooperation rather than enemy eradication.
These developments demonstrate that the U.S. no longer seeks costly military entanglements in the Middle East. Its priority is to maintain global leadership, particularly in competition with China. In such a context, a full-scale war with Iran—absent a direct threat to vital U.S. interests—would be unnecessary and contrary to overarching national security policy.
American policy is shifting from “value-based interventionism” (e.g., promoting democracy) toward strategic pragmatism: managing threats and costs without direct military involvement.
Conclusion: War Is an Unlikely and Costly Option
Considering public opposition, legal constraints, Trump’s electoral pledges, and the strategic shift toward competition with China and economic protection, the probability of a direct U.S. military conflict with Iran is extremely low.
Current threats and political maneuvering are more likely tools of coercive diplomacy than real preparations for war.
Without a clear and documented threat to U.S. national security, Congress will not provide legal, intelligence, or moral grounds for initiating war.
In reality, such a war would not only violate the Constitution but also jeopardize global security, the U.S. economy, and the legitimacy of American democracy.
