You want peace and security from Pakistan, but what are you ready to give Pakistan in return?
By Hafiz Mansour, politician and publicist
Original article: پاکستان – همسایه ناباب افغانستان/خراسان
Recently, I came across publications on Facebook that spoke about the need to improve relations between Afghanistan/Khorasan and Pakistan. These articles reflected their authors’ sincere desire for peace in the country. However, more was expected from such respected writers — namely, concrete proposals on how to establish friendly relations between the two states.
The weakness of these articles, in my view, lies in the fact that the authors regarded Afghanistan/Khorasan-Pakistani relations as uniform and unchanging, ignoring their ups and downs. Yet, since its founding to the present day, Pakistan has gone through several distinct phases in its dealings with Afghanistan/Khorasan, each shaped by its own conditions and circumstances. One cannot make a blanket judgment about the entirety of Pakistan’s political history.
From my perspective, these phases can be divided as follows:
First Phase (1947–1978)
In this period, it was Afghanistan that put pressure on Pakistan. Encouraged by the Soviet Union and India, Kabul raised the issue of “Pashtunistan,” questioned the legitimacy of the Durand Line, and even established a Ministry of Tribes and Border Affairs to meddle in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Schools were opened in Kabul for youth from across the Durand Line, and “Pashtunistan Day” was added to Afghanistan’s official calendar.
Second Phase (1978–1992)
After the April coup and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan/Khorasan, millions of refugees poured into Pakistan. Issues such as the Durand Line lost relevance, and “Pashtunistan Day” faded away. At times, Soviet aircraft and Kabul regime forces crossed into Pakistan’s territory. Still, Pakistan kept the flame of resistance alive by supporting the Afghanistan/Khorasan Mujahideen, while simultaneously expanding its intelligence influence inside Afghanistan.
Third Phase (1992–2001)
The fall of Najibullah’s regime at the hands of Ahmad Shah Massoud’s forces was a severe blow to Pakistan, which had hoped to fill the vacuum left by the Soviets. Pakistani writers began producing “new histories,” claiming that Afghanistan/Khorasan had been ruled for centuries from Delhi, as a way to justify interference.
At the same time, while sending diplomatic missions to Kabul, Islamabad tasked its intelligence agencies with supporting opponents of the Mujahideen government to prevent it from consolidating. Neither Rabbani’s visits to Pakistan nor Massoud’s conciliatory letters to Pakistani officials bore fruit. In the end, when Hekmatyar failed in his mission, Pakistan fostered the creation of the Taliban movement.
Fourth Phase (2001–2021)
During these 20 years, Pakistan played a double game: with one hand it offered “friendship” to Afghanistan and received billions of U.S. dollars under the banner of fighting terrorism, while with the other it actively supported the Taliban in cooperation with other neighbors of Afghanistan/Khorasan. The outcome was the collapse of the Afghanistan/Khorasan Republic.
Afghanistan/Khorasan leaders made concessions to appease Pakistan, but it was never enough:
Hamid Karzai publicly declared Afghanistan to be Pakistan’s “economic depth,” and even basic materials like stone and brick were imported from there.
For a period, Panjshiris were removed from leadership positions in the defense sector.
The Durand Line was fortified to Pakistan’s satisfaction.
Meanwhile, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) grew stronger, complicating matters further.
Fifth Phase (2021–present)
The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan/Khorasan was initially welcomed by many in Pakistan, but that joy soon turned to concern as TTP activity surged, destabilizing Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Pakistan now finds itself caught between two problems:
Its long-standing strategic plan to control Afghanistan/Khorasan, decades in the making;
The threat from the TTP, which has already inflicted serious blows.
Turning a blind eye to the Afghan Taliban is not simple. But if Islamabad were to distance itself from them, who could take their place? Thus, when people suggest opening a “new chapter” in Afghanistan/Khorasan-Pakistani relations, the key question arises: How can Pakistan be convinced? After all, Afghanistan/Khorasan wants peace and security from Pakistan. But what is it prepared to give in return?
