During the last forty days of President Ashraf Ghani's government, I was appointed acting Minister of Defense based on people's demands. This was while the Taliban had captured about 100 districts.
Author: Bismillah Muhammadi,
Former Minister of National Defense
Source: "Hashte Sobh" newspaper
The purpose of writing these lines is not to acquit me of the causes of the crisis and the fall of the regime to the Taliban; It is an explanation of some facts so that I can inform my people about it. The fact that I was not able to do effective work to defend the country at the end of my mission, I will mention here some of the reasons:
The collapse was not premature and sudden but had begun gradually and long ago.
The collapse began when the legitimacy of the republic's political system was weakened and meaningless by widespread fraud in the 2014 presidential election and the resulting crisis. Then the policies of President Ghani, who had usurped power in a fraudulent and vague election, further undermined this legitimacy, leading to the fall of power into the abyss. Although the formation of a national unity government temporarily contained the crisis by signing a political agreement, Mr. Ghani's sense of monopoly and selfishness and his lack of commitment to implementing the terms of the political agreement complicated and sustained the crisis, creating a deep gap between the people and the government. In addition, the situation left negative and disappointing effects on the motivation of the defense and security forces.
Contrary to the expectations of the people and the international community, the 2019 presidential election was still full of inaccuracies, fraud, and lies, and Ashraf Ghani was declared the ruler of the citadel. It was clear that during this period, he did not have one million votes, and Ghani's pre-seizure of power caused various crises and distrust of the defense and security forces towards the leadership levels of the government, and its harmful effects accelerated the fall of the regime.
Zalmai Khalilzad's direct US-led talks with the Taliban in the absence of the Afghan people and government, which began in Qatar in 2018 and ended the Doha agreement 18 months after the Afghan government failed, undermined the legitimacy and defense role of the armed forces. Ghani could not remove its negative effects from the defense and security forces. This had a devastating effect on the morale and role of the government's military forces.
WHAT EFFECTS DID THIS HAVE ON THE AFGHAN ARMY?
The declining support of US forces in military operations after the agreement, especially the reduction of air support and the subsequent cessation of that support, led the highly dependent Afghan military forces to collapse.
There was a severe stroke in the logistical and technical supplies of the forces. On the other hand, the Taliban were convinced of the Doha agreement that the Americans would not do anything against them. Therefore, they surrounded the distant defensive units whose supply routes were cut off from the ground, and the casualties of these units increased.
All 16,000 NATO contractors cut off support in the air and ground sectors without coordination. This led to a lack of air and ground support, especially in the aircraft repair department. The army did not have combat and transport aircraft to replace it. Thus, distant bases fell one after another. The cessation of US and NATO air and ground aid changed the war in favor of the Taliban.
The release of 7,000 Taliban prisoners, who had been arrested at the cost of the lives of soldiers of the country's security and defense forces, and their departure to the hot fronts, strengthened the Taliban and weakened the morale of the defense and security forces.
President Ghani's policies and actions in the name of reforming the army and rejuvenating it, which had more political, ethnic, and tasteful goals, caused thousands of experienced and professional officers and generals to leave the army and be forced to retire. This approach of the president greatly weakened the armed forces in terms of quality. The retirement age for officers was lowered by nine years without parliamentary approval, a decision that was more politically motivated than rejuvenating. Undoubtedly, the youth were the main and active force of the army, and the responsibility for the practical operations fell on them the most, but it requires the leadership and management of the war by capable and experienced people. In war, the first mistake is the last mistake.
Involvement of politics in the army was another blow to its body. Unfortunately, the President's approach to the Ministries of Defense and Security was inappropriate, leaving the matter to the National Security Adviser, Dr. Moheb, whose dislike and lack of knowledge of the battlefields led to the disintegration of the hierarchy and system of work.
Ghani, with his emotional qualities, eloquence, intrigue, and conspiracy, acted complexly, spending most of his time in so-called micromanagement, rather than important decisions and issues in the country.
Success in war and defense of the homeland depends on three principles:
Motivation;
Morale;
Order and discipline.
Unfortunately, these three principles were broken in the Afghan defense and security forces. The bravest commanders were reluctant to fight and stand up because of the discouragement and the current situation. The hierarchy was gone, there was no unity of command, and appointments were made according to taste. In the final weeks of his rule, the main command was in the hands of Mr. Moheb in the Security Council, and he did not give a damn about the Ministries of Defense and Security at all. The promotion of officers had fallen short of the standard, recruitment to the army was at an all-time low, and heavy daily casualties had reduced the army's activities to a minimum.
One day I went and told Mr. Ghani about the problem of multiplicity. He promised to correct, but he did not keep his promises. Mr. Moheb, not having enough understanding of the military profession and having just false pride, deliberately and consciously disbanded the national army.
President Ghani had created another government within the citadel for himself and his inner circle, which led the Afghan army to weakness and disintegration, depriving its members of any motivation or spirit of war.
In addition to the above factors, two tactical moves by the Taliban were effective in strengthening their position and "legitimizing" their war, but also reducing the motivation of the Afghan Defense and Security Forces resistance:
1) The Taliban's widespread propaganda for the legitimacy of their war narrative against the end of the occupation and the eradication of widespread corruption.
2) The Taliban's flexibility in dealing with current members of the defense and security forces at various levels and creating opportunities for them to return to their homes and pursue a policy of non-revenge in the event of the fall of the regime.
AFTER MY APPOINTMENT
I was appointed acting Minister of Defense by Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, who served as chairman of the Supreme National Reconciliation Council, under a political power-sharing agreement. The reason I accepted this responsibility in such a sensitive situation was based on my intention to be able to at least contribute to the defense of the homeland. When I started working, I realized the problems after a brief review and assessment. I knew the situation from the outside, but it was completely different from the inside. What was happening in the government and why I could not do the necessary work have many reasons.
After careful consideration and consultation with the army leadership, I discovered two major problems:
Weak leadership;
Lack of logistical and technical support.
These two problems had weakened the morale of the officers and reduced the combat capability of the army. I acted to the best of my ability with my legal powers and competencies, but appointments to general posts, which were the competence of the president, had to be offered by us, which, unfortunately, was the whole problem. He accepted several of our proposals, but the rest were shelved. When I told the president, he was instructing Dr. Moheb, who, unfortunately, was inactive.
WHAT WAS GOING ON IN THE GOVERNMENT?
In these sensitive circumstances, numerous and breathtaking meetings were held in the government. Hours passed, but no decision was made. The president knew the real situation, but those around him were deceiving him or he did not want to understand the situation.
So when this was the case, questions arise; among other things, why did I accept this post in such a complicated situation? Why could I not defend my homeland? Why didn't I tell the problem about the people? Why did not I resign? And where was the problem?
My dear compatriots have the right to have such questions because their destiny has been played with and they have suffered a lot, poverty, unemployment, migration, and many calamities.
However, I came to this intention in the 90th minute, in a very complicated and complicated situation, in order to at least serve in the defense of my country. But President Ashraf Ghani, with his policies and his multi-member circle, had dismantled the Afghan army. There was no motivation, morale, and wish for the army so that I could prevent the certain death of the regime. I called to the strongest and most courageous army commanders we had worked with for years, why there is no defense? Soldiers were said to have lost their morale and motivation.
In those days, it was hard for me to step aside and say that the system was not defensible and would fall. It was very difficult for me to announce this news. Unfortunately, President Ghani, with a special circle inside the Arg, had made the system indefensible.
It is appropriate to express my gratitude for the sacrifices of the members of the country's defense and security forces, who have fought to defend the homeland against its internal enemies and foreign supporters for the past 20 years. May the souls of the martyrs of the defense and security members of the country be happy and their memory is cherished.
Why did the Taliban launch attacks and purges from the north and northeast?
In the past, these areas were a natural base for resistance led by Ahmad Shah Massoud, the National Hero of the country. These areas were used as a popular base in the resistance against the Taliban, and the Taliban were unable to occupy these areas despite repeated attacks. This time, unlike in the past, the Taliban wanted to clear these areas first, so that there would be no opportunity to revive the resistance front. For this reason, this time the Taliban launched their attacks from the northeast and north and later continued in the western area.
THE EVENTS OF THE LAST THREE DAYS OF THE FALL
I had reliable information from inside the citadel that Mr. Moheb had been in contact with the Haqqani and that they had had continuous conversations, but I did not know about the president's intention to flee.
On the evening of Friday, August 13, 2021, I flew to Bala Hesar with the president, only Vahid Omar was with us. There we went up the high hill, I saw that the microphone was ready. I asked Vahid Omar what is going on. He said that the president must appeal to the nation. I stood by the president. The focus of his speech was resistance. The President said that the leaders of Afghanistan, in a situation where foreigners attacked the country, declared their resistance from here, and I follow them and call on the nation to unite against foreign aggression.
We returned from Bala Hesar. I went to the Ministry of Defense and asked about the situation. The Taliban are said to be besieging Kabul after capturing Maidan Wardak and Logar, and a number of their supporters and opportunists in various parts of Kabul are chanting pro-Taliban slogans. At night, Dr. Moheb called and said that we should meet once with the Minister of Interior and the Head of Security. We gathered at the Ministry of Defense. Dr. Moheb asked me what the president's interview was about. I explained what happened. I do not know why they prevented its publication. The security situation was analyzed; we all agreed that the situation is out of control. Moheb has falsified this statement in his recent statements, the Panjshir issue was not raised at all, because all the problems and talk were focused on Kabul. The eastern provinces of Paktia had not yet fallen. More importantly, in the last week, Dr. Moheb was upset, and that night he made contradictory speeches that the members of the meeting were/are witnessing.
On Saturday, the Taliban advanced from the Maidan Wardak and Logar gates to the gates of Kabul, and unrest increased in the city. People were terrified of what would happen. The president called once or twice and asked about the situation. A cabinet meeting was scheduled for the same day, but many ministers did not attend.
On Sunday, the security situation worsened. Employees of government offices, both civilian and military, were fleeing. At 10 a.m. that day, the president called to inquire about the situation. I explained. I asked the president to hold an emergency meeting. He told me that he will tell Dr. Moheb.
It was around 12 noon when the Presidential Guards (PPS) arrived at the Ministry of Defense and announced that the President was coming. I thought an emergency meeting would be held. The intelligence chief of the ministry's headquarters came and said that a large number of the Presidential Guards (PPS), numbering about 150, had arrived at the ministry square in a helicopter yard. The president's special bodyguards returned at one o'clock, but the people who had come to the helicopter field were present.
At around 2 pm on Sunday, August 15, 2021, three helicopter wings took off from the Arg and flew north. I saw the helicopters from the window in my office. I thought they were coming and going as usual. The three wings of the president's helicopter were always in the citadel, and their command was naturally in their own hands. Ten minutes later, former President Hamid Karzai called and said Ghani had fled. I said that three helicopters flew ten minutes ago. The former president said, "Did I not say that this man is drowning the country?" Unfortunately, he drowned and escaped himself. The air force commander later informed me that the fourth helicopter had taken off from the airport on Moheb's orders and that all four helicopters had fled to Uzbekistan.
It is noteworthy that the president's visit to Khost province was scheduled for Friday, August 13, but did not take place for unknown reasons. But Khost province fell on August 15 (Sunday morning) and the president was aware of it.
After the escape of Ashraf Ghani, I stayed in the ministry until the evening of that day with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. The situation was broken. We went to the Air Force command building. There we decided to go to Panjshir with Ahmad Massoud, the son of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the National Hero, and the former Minister of the Interior, Taj Mohammad Jahed, who we were together with another group of colleagues. A helicopter wing was prepared to transport us, and Ahmad Massoud and some of his companions flew to Panjshir, and we were scheduled to fly with the next helicopter. Unfortunately, it was night, the situation in the airport was broken, and we were not able to go to Panjshir due to the lack of a helicopter. Roads had fallen to the Taliban.
At night, we were flown to the UAE with former Interior Minister Taj Mohammad Jahed with the help of UAE diplomats leaving Kabul.
I spent my whole life in jihad, resistance, and defense of the homeland. I have never left it. This time I left it and It has been done in exchange for the salvation of my people and my dear homeland. God willing, we will free our homeland in an atmosphere of trust, understanding, empathy, mutual acceptance, the prayers of the suffering people of our country.
