What Lies Behind the Claimed “Security”
By Abdul Naser Noorzad, researcher in politics and geopolitics, especially for “Sangar”
When a system’s pride in “security” collapses into a mere propaganda display, it can no longer be accepted as a genuine achievement. What is presented as nationwide security, a corruption-free system, and social justice is, in reality, part of a deliberate psychological operation reproduced by media under this group’s control and its lobbyists to manufacture and purchase artificial legitimacy. This narrative is not a reflection of reality, but rather an attempt to conceal the deep gap between claims and the objective condition of society. The claim of complete security collapses at its core when exposed to people’s daily experiences, because not only does physical security no longer exist, but individual, legal, social, political, and cultural security are all trapped within an ambiguous, controlled, and deliberately complicated environment.
In a system where corruption is deeply embedded in its very fabric, security naturally turns into a tradable commodity. Here, security is not a public right, but a privilege distributed within the framework of power relations. Perhaps the heaviest cost citizens pay in such a situation is precisely this commodification of security; where the state is not only incapable of controlling corruption but has itself become part of the mechanism that produces and reproduces it. In such a context, public trust collapses, and the concept of the state as a provider of order and justice gives way to a profit-driven and patronage-based structure.
In recent years, the Taliban have attempted to impose a narrative of “fabricated security” to project a controlled image of stability. This narrative has been built upon repression, systemic poverty, and widespread pressure on society. However, security that emerges from fear and restriction is not only unsustainable but gradually erodes the very concept of security itself. A society in which fundamental freedoms are eliminated and citizens live in a constant state of anxiety and uncertainty cannot embody real security; it is merely held in a state of enforced stagnation and artificial stillness.
At the same time, one of the most significant indicators of structural corruption is the group’s inability to control its own internal forces. The Taliban’s military and wartime structure, once based on guerrilla networks, hired groups, and informal ties, has now turned into a complex challenge for its leadership. These forces, once instruments for achieving wartime objectives, have now become independent and sometimes conflicting actors pursuing their own interests. This situation demonstrates that power within this structure is not centralized but fragmented and competitive, creating fertile ground for the expansion of corruption.
Competition over financial and economic resources, especially in the absence of transparent and accountable formal institutions has become the central axis of internal disputes. Contrary to common perceptions that portray intra-group tensions within the Taliban as ideological, the reality is that these conflicts are largely driven by access to revenue-generating resources, control of customs, exploitation of mines, share in foreign financial aid, and management of monetary flows. Such disputes, due to their direct link to economic interests, are not only deeper but more destructive than ideological differences, as each faction seeks to capture a larger share of limited resources.
Corruption within this structure has a networked and deeply intertwined nature. Institutions that are supposed to enforce the law and deliver justice have themselves turned into mechanisms for generating income. The police, courts, and other judicial bodies have, in many cases, lost their primary functions and become part of the cycle of corruption. In such conditions, justice is no longer a principle but a service delivered in exchange for payment or political loyalty. This situation not only undermines the system’s legitimacy but also pushes society toward distrust and instability.
At higher levels, even the foreign policy apparatus and external representations have not remained immune to this trend. The emergence of financial networks abroad that regularly channel specific funds into the country indicates that corruption has evolved into a transnational system. These networks are used not only to secure financial resources but also to bypass international pressures and sustain the ruling structure. As a result, the boundary between foreign policy and opaque economic practices disappears, with both serving the survival of an unaccountable order.
Efforts to establish special units to combat corruption may appear to signal an awareness of the problem, but in practice, they face serious contradictions. When corruption functions as a source of power and a tool for distributing privilege, eliminating or restricting it effectively weakens the very structure built upon it. For this reason, any attempt at reform either fails or becomes absorbed into the dynamics of power itself. This contradiction is one of the primary reasons behind the inability to achieve internal reform in such systems.
At the administrative level, the process of appointments clearly reflects the depth of this crisis. Government positions are not assigned based on merit, but rather in exchange for payments or guarantees of financial transfers. This turns the state into a marketplace where offices are sold, and each individual, in order to recover their investment, is compelled to participate in the cycle of corruption. This cycle is self-reinforcing and gradually engulfs the entire structure.
Competition over natural resources, particularly mines, has also become a major arena of conflict. Northern and northeastern regions of Afghanistan are continuously witnessing clashes among groups that are, in one way or another, connected to the power structure. These conflicts are not only the result of poor resource management but also the direct consequence of turning national resources into assets for capture within a non-transparent system. Under such conditions, national resources, instead of serving development, become tools of rivalry and conflict.
Control over transit routes, highways, customs, and other key economic points is also in the hands of individuals who are either linked to power circles or have obtained these positions through large payments. These actors, by directing financial flows, play a decisive role in resource distribution, leading to the merging of formal and informal economies. The result is the emergence of a shadow economy in which transparency and accountability have no place.
Alongside all these factors, the use of organized crime networks, drug trafficking, and links with extremist groups reflects a fundamental transformation in the nature of this structure. The Taliban are no longer merely an ideological group but have evolved into a complex power–wealth network that uses every possible tool to sustain itself. This transformation not only further erodes their legitimacy but also introduces broader security risks.
Ultimately, what is presented as security is less an objective reality and more a constructed narrative. While this narrative may serve a short-term function of control, it will, in the long run, collapse under the weight of social and economic realities. As the gap between claim and reality deepens, the likelihood of internal crises and structural breakdown increases. In such a situation, security is not only unguaranteed but becomes one of the primary victims of a corrupt system.
