Abdullah Abdullah heard the news of Ashraf Ghani's escape from a phone call from Hamid Karzai, who said: "The man ran away". He said in response to Zalmai Khalilzad's phone call: "You ruined the homeland. May God punish you!"
Author: Fazl Ahmad Manawi,
former Minister of Justice of Afghanistan
The purpose of this memo is to explain the events that took place from the fall of Kabul to the Taliban to the group's clashes with the National Resistance Front in Panjshir.
This memo briefly addresses a corner of the Panjshir War. We hope, it can be the beginning of addressing the dark and obscure corners of events, and readers can understand the facts and judge fairly.
This note is based on documents I have personally witnessed from the fall of Kabul until the Panjshir conflict.
The collapse of the system has numerous reasons and factors, which I will write about in detail in another note. What was surprising and unpredictable for everyone, including the Americans, even the Taliban, and its supporters, was the speed of the fall.
In my opinion, one of the reasons for the collapse, among other factors, was the crisis of legitimacy and the resulting tensions in the last two elections.
Disbeliefs developed to such an extent that the people became distrustful of the system as a whole and did not feel compelled to defend the rule of a few individuals.
Unaware that the system was not someone's personal property, but the twenty-year-old capital of a nation built at a cost of billions of dollars. Аfter determining the timetable for the withdrawal of American troops, the Afghan army ceased hostilities in the past three months.
The commando forces that were left alone on the battlefield were exhausted by the scattered fighting. As a result, the security situation in neighboring provinces deteriorated sharply. The enemy threatened the Kabul ring, and there were no defensive lines or rings in Kabul.
From the very beginning of the insurgency, the Taliban dreamed of victory again, believing in the overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the defeat of NATO/US.
Where this self-confidence came from is another matter, but from the beginning, the group's only concern was their re-encounter with other ethnic groups, especially in the north.
In 2007, a Taliban representative met with me. In that meeting, referring to the certainty of their victory, he said: "We want the north, the south and everyone to share in our victory this time. We want to convince the religious scholars of the North to fight together along with us and this will be a victory for all, not for one side and one people".
He asked me to cooperate. I said that if you provide a satisfactory answer to the next three questions, I will cooperate: First, how do you legally define the legitimacy of war? Second, where are the facilities, including weapons, ammunition, and other needs of your front, provided from? And third, what will be the structure of your system after the victory? Is it like your previous government or do you have another model in mind?
"I do not have the answers to all three questions, I delivered the message, now it is your decision," he said.
However, over time, the Taliban succeeded in infiltrating the north of the country and preparing to take over as foreign troops withdrew. What it did not want and did not have is a compiled plan to rule.
FROM THE DAY OF THE FALL OF KABUL TO REACHING PANJSHIR
In the last days when the bell of the complete collapse was rung and many government officials had relocated their families abroad, my family and I decided not to leave people alone and not to leave the country under any circumstances.
On Sunday, August 15, I went to the office in my usual dress after the morning prayer. The presence of employees was very small compared to the previous days. Confusion and astonishment were evident in the faces of the staff, the people, and the city. I did my daily chores, but around ten o'clock I noticed that the situation was changing rapidly. I slowly left the office and directed my assistant to move my personal belongings from the office to the house.
That morning, I left my rented house in Kabul and decided to send my family and property to Panjshir, but due to the congestion, the news of the fall of Parwan and Kapisa provinces came before they left the city. Since the roads were blocked, the family was forced to move to a friend's house.
Before eleven in the morning, I went to Sepidar Palace to see Dr. Abdullah to inquire about his condition. They said he is in his house. I walked in the courtyard of Sepidar until 12 o'clock, and then we went to Dr. Abdullah's house with Haji Abdul Qahar, the head of the office of the Supreme Reconciliation Council.
"The Americans have assured that the Taliban will not enter the city for another two weeks, but they have demanded that order prevails in the city," Dr. Abdullah said after the greeting.
He added that they would travel to Doha that evening to reach an agreement on peace, but Americans asked them to go with a different and more flexible agenda this time.
Dr. Abdullah was preparing to travel to Qatar when Mr. Karzai called him around 1 pm.
"The man (Ghani) ran away," said Mr. Karzai. "Who did say?" Dr. Abdullah asked in surprise. He answered: "A man from PPS." The news was confirmed by another source moments later.
I asked Dr. Sahib (Abdullah) what we should do now. “I will not leave my house, whatever happens, let it be in my house, I don’t want to be disrespected,” he said.
I suggested that he go with me to Panjshir. He asked how. I said, first I would try to find a helicopter, if it didn’t work out, we would move with an armored column and fight and pass wherever we encountered an obstacle.
He did not agree and said: "The resistance is impossible, we also used Tus Qara (♠) (ace of spades) but it did not work".
He was referring to the selection of Bismillah Mohammadi to the post of Minister of Defense. He instructed his bodyguards to get ready.
I changed my formal clothes by wearing the national clothes I borrowed from Dr. Sahib, and when he came out again I told him that you were the leader and now it's time to manage the crisis, decide and you have to get out of here. This time he also refused.
At that moment, he received a phone call from Mr. Khalilzad and he also announced the escape of the President. In response to Khalilzad, Dr. Abdullah said: "You have ruined the homeland, may God punish you."
With this answer, he disconnected the call. I had to leave my guards and cars there and go to a friend's house in a taxi with an unarmed bodyguard. The next day I arrived in Panjshir by taxi.
DEFENSE PREPARATIONS AND NEGOTIATION WITH THE TALIBAN
Arriving in Panjshir, we started preparing for defense. All my personal weapons and military equipment remained in Kabul, which was transferred to Panjshir a few days later for a fee.
In addition, two days before the fall, a friend had sent me several American weapons M16, all of which I had transported to Panjshir.
Unfortunately, due to the lack of ammunition in Panjshir, we could not use them until the last moment.
It should be noted that all the facilities I had were at my own expense and I had not received any money or weapons from anyone in Panjshir.
We started the meetings with Young Amir Ahmad Massoud, the vice-president Amrullah Saleh, and other brothers. Unfortunately, few prominent Panjshir figures were able to get there. Some did not want to resist. Delegations began to negotiate with the Taliban, but they demanded only Panjshir's surrender.
Although Young Amir showed a resilient spirit, the Taliban threatened war.
A number of compatriots, including religious scholars and veteran mujahideen of Panjshir, Parwan, and Kapisa, acted as mediators to encourage reconciliation with the Taliban.
Some of them concerned about their wealth and possessions, saw this role as a shield to the preservation of their lives, property, dark past, and sought to make achievements for the Taliban. The Taliban also welcomed them to some extent. We needed time and therefore did not refuse to negotiate with any group or faction.
We all knew that there was no necessary preparation for war in Panjshir and it was not possible to prepare fully for war in the opportunity we had.
Panjshir province had quietly become a tourist area for 20 years. In a short time, it could not stand against the Taliban monster that had conquered all of Afghanistan, was at the height of his pride, and, in their own words, defeated NATO and the United States and overthrew the 20-year-old regime with all its military units. However, we had to choose one of two ways, there was no third way. The first way was the war that was doomed to defeat, but would lead to continuing the resistance, the second way - capitulation, which would bring historical shame and our people would never forgive us.
We have all unanimously pledged that we will defend ourselves if war is imposed and this is our legitimate right. In this way, martyrdom is our honor and if we survive, we will stay with our people.
I should note that the weapons and ammunition left over from the first resistance were mostly unusable because they were not stored properly and were outdated (the military is well aware of this).
Our main concern was the economic blockade. To this end, it was decided to try to store food and fuel until the supply routes are blocked. Despite these efforts, the opportunity was lost and we had little time.
There was only one entrance to Panjshir that made the defense easier in the first resistance. Nevertheless, this time we had to defend six-vehicle entrances and several pedestrian crossings. Roads including 1) main road, 2) Darband, 3) Shutul, known as Chilanak Road, 4) Khawak Pass, 5) Anjuman Pass, and partly 6) Arib Pass were to be fortified.
Also, five pedestrian crossings, including Abdullah Khel Pass, Allah Akbar Pass, Abshar Valley Pass, Yellow Pass (Takhar side), and Parandeh Pass, had to be covered, but we had less opportunity to fully cover them.
Unlike the first resistance, in which Badakhshan and Takhar were safe fronts, this time they were the main threat. Due to the ongoing war in Andarab, we did not block the Khawak Pass, which later became a problem and the first line of defense broke through that route.
We sent delegations to the Taliban leaders in Badakhshan not to attack from Anjuman Pass, but they refused. They said: "We have no choice but to obey the Emirate and when we do not fight, we will lose trust".
In addition to what has been said, some of the army units that entered the Panjshir Valley had a different view of the valley. They saw Panjshir as a valley of utopia in which everything was favorable. They imagined that guesthouses would be more open to them and better served by the system of government. Nevertheless, unfortunately, contrary to their expectations, due to the difficult conditions of the war, they faced problems that they did not expect.
Although Mr. Saleh provided them with good financial resources, they could not adapt to the new situation and most of them left their jobs and returned to their homes. Those who remained were mostly residents of Panjshir who could not play much of a role; Of course, with the exception of some who are still in the trenches of honor.
(To be continued)
