Betting on a single actor — the Taliban — weakens Russia’s position in Afghanistan.
Author: Oleg Akulinichev, orientalist, former diplomat, who worked at Russian embassies in Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries of the East.
Source: Kommersant (Russia)
The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has expressed concern over the sharp escalation in relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which has led to armed clashes. This was stated on April 20 by CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov. According to him, Afghanistan remains at the center of attention for member states of the bloc, as it continues to be “a source of potential cross-border challenges and threats to Central Asia.”
The country, which, after the withdrawal of the Western coalition in 2021, some experts hastily classified as a “new normal,” continues in fact to be shaken — and with doubled intensity. April 2026 leaves no room for illusions: neither the Taliban’s military victory nor their public efforts to maintain order have resolved the situation. Around present-day Afghanistan, not merely a prolonged humanitarian crisis is unfolding, but a full-fledged regional conflict that threatens to redraw the map of Central Asia. And, regrettably, Russia’s strategic projects — on which significant hopes had been placed — have become hostages to this turbulence.
The main development, which Western media present as a local border dispute, in reality has much deeper roots. Since late February 2026, Afghanistan and Pakistan have been in a state of “open war” — a term already used by both diplomats and military officials. This is not about sporadic skirmishes, but about systematic airstrikes and mortar shelling from both sides. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), from February to early April alone, at least 97 civilians have been killed, and nearly 100,000 people have been displaced. Afghan authorities put the figures ten times higher.
At the root of the problem is the Pakistani Taliban, a group that has long established itself in Afghanistan’s border provinces. Islamabad demands that Kabul eliminate its sanctuaries. Kabul either shrugs or limits itself to general promises.
Talks mediated by China in Urumqi in early April provided only a formal reason for optimism: the sides agreed to “prevent escalation,” but just a few days later, women and children were again killed in Pakistan as a result of Afghan shelling. This is a case where diplomacy stalls and weapons speak louder.
For Moscow, this conflict is a matter of serious concern. Our special envoy, Zamir Kabulov — a highly experienced diplomat and orientalist who knows both the situation and the local players better than most — notes that tensions between Kabul and Islamabad are directly hindering Russia’s infrastructure projects. These include the construction of the Trans-Afghan railway (the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar project) and, possibly, an oil refinery. As long as bullets are flying along the border, no one will lay tracks or build pipelines.
Moscow has chosen a pragmatic course. In January 2026, President Vladimir Putin accepted the credentials of an ambassador appointed by the Taliban government. In April, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation suspended the ban on the Taliban’s activities, effectively removing it from the list of terrorist organizations. This is a strong diplomatic gesture that opens the way for full-fledged economic cooperation.
Indeed, negotiations on the supply of 2 million tons of Russian fuel per year are at the final stage. Trade turnover between the countries has already reached $538 million.
At first glance, this seems like the long-awaited breakthrough. But unfortunately, without stability along the borders and within Afghanistan itself, these figures will remain merely potential. The conflict with Pakistan has demonstrated the fragility of any economic agreements: as long as Kabul cannot guarantee the security of transport corridors, investing billions in infrastructure makes little sense.
China, in this regard, is acting more cautiously, yet more assertively: Beijing has already invested $3.5 billion in the Mes Aynak copper deposit and $500 million in solar energy. However, Chinese projects are not immune to Afghanistan’s instability either.
But while political maneuvering still leaves room for flexibility, the figures of the humanitarian catastrophe leave no room for euphemisms.
According to UN forecasts for 2026, 21.9 million Afghans — nearly half of the country’s population — are in need of humanitarian assistance. More than 17 million people are on the brink of acute hunger. Just imagine: a country that once fed itself is now unable to feed even a third of its citizens.
The crisis is being exacerbated by the mass return of refugees. In 2026 alone, hundreds of thousands of Afghans have returned from Iran and Pakistan, pushed out by the tightening of migration policies in neighboring countries. These people have neither housing, nor jobs, nor prospects. They are swelling the ranks of the poor and, even more dangerously, becoming easy targets for recruiters of radical groups. Experts warn that Afghanistan once again risks turning into an incubator of international terrorism. And this is no longer a forecast but a statement of fact: according to Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, up to 23,000 militants of various affiliations are operating on the country’s territory, from Al-Qaeda to ISIS-Khorasan (recognized as terrorist organizations and banned in the Russian Federation).
The outlook is bleak. The Afghan–Pakistani confrontation has entered a phase of permanent conflict; neither side is ready to make concessions, and mechanisms of external pressure have virtually disappeared.
However, it would be naive to assume that Washington, having spent twenty years occupying Afghanistan and withdrawing its troops only in 2021, has completely lost interest in the region. Behind the propaganda noise and the apparent diplomatic confusion surrounding the current Middle Eastern crisis (the aggression against Iran), one cannot fail to see the main point: the United States is consistently pursuing its long-term strategy, aimed not at the alleged “possession of nuclear weapons,” but at reshaping the region, competing for resources, countering China, and containing Russia. After twenty years of occupation, the United States and its allies, contrary to all forecasts, have retained the ability to influence the course of events. And we should harbor no illusions: more surprises lie ahead, as always, unexpected.
For Moscow, this means the need to reconsider its strategy. Betting on a single actor — the Taliban — while ignoring the regional context may result in the loss of even its already modest positions.
A more flexible policy is needed: dialogue on regional issues with Kabul, Islamabad, Tehran, and Dushanbe alike. What is required are real, not merely declarative, mechanisms for monitoring security along the borders.
Afghanistan will not become stable in the foreseeable future. But we can and must protect our economic interests and, more importantly, prevent the chaos beyond the southern borders from spilling over into Central Asia. The time of illusions is over. The time of hard pragmatism and sober calculation has arrived.
