Iran’s behavior is aggressive in words and restrained in actions.
Author: Muhammad Qadir Mesbah, Regional Affairs Expert
For several days now, I have been observing the behavior and reactions of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran through social media, audio, and video materials. My mind involuntarily connects with several concepts from the field of international relations. I find it necessary to share this with the audience and those interested in political discussions. I present my thoughts without bias so that they can be understood as objectively as possible. In any case, the essence of the topic and its main ideas should not be lost.
Within the framework of international relations, we discuss two approaches — defensive realism and aggressive realism. These concepts help describe the current situation in Iran as an unstable balance of power, in which the state oscillates between two contradictory but complementary logics: the logic of survival and the logic of maximizing security. These oscillations are not the result of a conscious choice and may be a direct consequence of simultaneous internal and external pressures, as the strategic decision-making capacity is clearly limited.
From the perspective of defensive realism, Iran today faces a clear and tangible weakening of national power resources. The economy, which forms the basis of both the state’s “hard” and “soft” power, is exhausting, and the state’s ability to provide even a minimum level of welfare and comfort — a key condition for internal stability — has been significantly reduced. In defensive logic, this situation itself is considered a threat and a contradiction to national security, as widespread public dissatisfaction can even undermine internal cohesion and the state’s control over society.
The state’s response to this threat is a focus on internal security, suppression of protests, and control over information and the internet — behavior that, in the logic of realist rulers, is not a deviation but a rational reaction to preserve survival. In this context, the state tries to prevent the spread of the crisis and minimize the costs of instability, even if this comes at the expense of reduced legitimacy and increased hidden discontent.
Foreign policy also demonstrates defensive logic, avoiding direct conflict with major powers. For example, Abbas Araqchi, Iran’s foreign minister, despite sharp statements, refrains from direct military conflict with the United States and emphasizes indirect deterrence and management of tension levels.
This behavior shows that the state is aware of the real limitations of its power and understands that a large-scale external conflict could exacerbate the internal crisis and threaten the survival of the regime. In this sense, Iran’s foreign policy is more reactive and conservative than aggressive, and its main goal is to prevent the worst-case scenarios for the country.
However, at the same time, this situation can also be interpreted within the framework of aggressive realism. Aggressive realism is based on the premise that in an anarchic international system, security is never guaranteed, and states are compelled to demonstrate power and raise the cost for their enemies to prevent future threats.
From this perspective, part of Iran’s behavior — from emphasizing missile capabilities and military deterrence to maintaining regional influence and attempting to compensate for internal weaknesses through external displays of power, including the symbolic presence of powers such as Russia and China — aligns with this logic. Under pressure, the state seeks to transfer part of the threat outward to simultaneously deter enemies and strengthen internal cohesion through external encirclement.
The main difference between today’s Iran and a classical aggressive state is that the resources needed to maximize power are not fully available. Aggressive realism is effective when there is sufficient economic and institutional backing. In the absence of such support, a display of power may lead to increased external pressure.
Therefore, Iran’s aggressive behavior is often limited, symbolic, and calculated: aggressive in words, restrained in actions. This combination shows that the state is trying to maintain an image of strength without high cost.
Most likely, Iran is currently in a state of complete pause between defensive and aggressive realism — it is not strong enough to consistently pursue a strategy of aggressive realism, nor safe enough to rely solely on passive defense. This condition is a sign of an unstable balance, where any new economic, social, or security shock can abruptly tip the scales in one direction or another.
In realist logic, the main threat to Iran is not protests themselves or external pressure individually, but the inability to manage internal and external threats.
Therefore, the central question within defensive and aggressive realism is not which direction Iran has the right to move, but whether the state can restore its power resources so that its defensive behavior remains legitimate and its aggressive behavior remains deterrent, and is perceived as such.
If this restoration does not occur soon, the current unstable balance will sooner or later transform into a more structural crisis, and Iran will follow a crisis path in which the logic of survival escapes rational management, turning the country into a devastated state.
