A Multipolar World Is Born with the Collapse of NATO
By Abdul Naser Noorzad, security and geopolitics researcher, especially for Sangar
Statements by Donald Trump that “without the United States, the North Atlantic Alliance is nothing more than a paper tiger” are not so much a temporary political stance as a sign of a deep fracture in the West’s security architecture. His criticism of European NATO member states and accusations of their inability or unwillingness to confront crises such as a war with Iran, in fact, reflect a strategic divergence between the two sides of the Atlantic—a divergence rooted in differences in interests, priorities, and perceptions of threats.
The key question is whether it is possible to speak of NATO without the United States, or of the United States without this alliance. Theoretically, such a scenario is possible; however, in practice, it would entail high costs and profound consequences for the international order. The alliance was formed after World War II in the context of ideological and geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the United States has played a central role in it, both militarily and in terms of political coordination. The extensive network of U.S. military bases around the world has served as an instrument of this dominance and remains an important component of the West’s deterrence capability.
However, NATO today is no longer the same alliance as it was during the Cold War. At that time, there was a clear and shared threat that ensured cohesion within the alliance, whereas today threats are fragmented, multilayered, and often disputed among members. Over the past two decades, Europe has faced a range of economic, social, and security crises—from the consequences of the global financial crisis to the effects of the coronavirus pandemic and the shock caused by the war in Ukraine. These developments have not only put pressure on Europe’s economic capacity but have also exposed its strategic dependencies, particularly in the energy sector.
Under these conditions, the concept of “European strategic autonomy” has been raised more frequently, yet it remains incomplete. On the one hand, Europe needs the American “security umbrella,” and on the other, it seeks to reduce its dependence on it. This situation creates a kind of structural duality that prevents the formation of a coherent and independent security policy. In essence, Europe possesses the economic and industrial potential to become an independent actor, but the lack of unified political will has prevented this potential from being realized.
At the same time, the United States is also facing serious challenges. Contrary to the simplistic view that a decline in the alliance’s role signifies a complete decline of American power, Washington’s main problem is not the loss of power but the erosion of its legitimacy and global appeal. The United States remains one of the world’s largest military powers; however, the use of this power without the support of allies becomes more costly and politically difficult. The experiences of military interventions in recent decades and the growing distrust among allies have only intensified this trend.
Meanwhile, other actors are seeking to redefine the global order. China, focusing on economic instruments, and Russia, operating within a more hardline and confrontational security framework, are each attempting to fill the vacuums emerging in the international system. Groupings such as BRICS, although not yet a full-fledged alternative to the Western order, indicate a desire among non-Western countries to reduce dependence on structures led by the United States.
In this context, Europe increasingly resembles not an independent actor but an arena of rivalry among major powers. On the one hand, it faces pressure from the United States to align against China and Russia; on the other, due to economic and energy ties, it cannot fully distance itself from these actors. This situation complicates strategic decision-making for European countries and often leads to contradictions.
Therefore, the current crisis of the alliance cannot be reduced merely to political disagreements or sharp statements by leaders. The core issue lies in a crisis of defining a “common threat” and, consequently, a crisis of strategic cohesion. In the absence of a single, clearly defined adversary, alliances gradually transform from stable structures into more flexible, temporary, and issue-oriented arrangements.
Ultimately, what is unfolding is neither the immediate collapse of NATO nor the complete isolation of the United States, but a gradual transition from a unipolar to a more fluid and multipolar world. In this new order, power is distributed among various actors, and factors such as legitimacy, economics, and technology play a role no less significant than military strength in determining the standing of states. These changes place the future of U.S.-European relations in an uncertain yet decisive position—one that may shape the global balance of power for decades to come.
